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Abstract: 
In this study, we use data from the Federal Reserve’s 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small 
Business Finances to classify small businesses into four groups based upon their credit needs and 
to model the credit allocation process into a sequence of three steps. First, do firms need credit? 
We classify those that do not as “non-borrowers;” these firms have received scant attention in the 
literature even though they account for more than half of all small firms. Second, do firms need 
credit but fail to apply because they feared being turned down? We classify such firms as 
“discouraged borrowers.” Like non-borrowers, discouraged borrowers have received little 
attention in the literature and often are pooled with firms who applied for, but were denied, 
credit. Discouraged borrowers outnumber firms that applied for, but were denied, credit by more 
than two to one. Third, do firms apply for credit, but get turned down? We classify such firms as 
“denied borrowers.” Finally, we classify firms that applied for, and were extended, credit as 
“approved borrowers.”  Our results reveal strong and significant differences among each of these 
four groups of firms. Non-borrowers look very much like approved borrowers, consistent with 
the Pecking-Order Theory of capital structure. Discouraged borrowers resemble denied 
borrowers in many respects, but are significantly different along a number of dimensions. This 
finding calls into question the results from previous studies that have pooled together these two 
groups of firms in analyzing credit allocation. Finally, we find strong evidence that denied 
borrowers differ from approved borrowers across numerous characteristics, as previously 
documented in the literature. Of particular note, minority owned-firms, and especially Black-
owned firms, were denied credit at a far higher rate than firms with owners who were white.  
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Who Needs Credit and Who Gets Credit? 
Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finances 
 
1. Introduction 
Among small businesses, who needs credit and who gets credit? The answer to this 
question is of great importance not only to the firms themselves, but also to prospective lenders 
to these firms and to policymakers interested in the financial health of these firms. The 
availability of credit is one of the most fundamental issues facing a small business and, therefore, 
has received much attention in the academic literature (see, e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Berger and Udell, 1995; Cole, 1998).   
However, many small firms indicate that they do not need credit (“non-borrowers”) while 
others indicate that they need credit but did not apply for credit—so-called “discouraged 
borrowers.” Non-borrowers essentially have been ignored by the existing literature; we know of 
no studies that have analyzed these firms separately from firms that need credit. Discouraged 
borrowers have received scant attention in the literature, and the studies that have analyzed them 
often combine them into potentially inappropriate groups. For example, “discouraged borrowers” 
are combined with “denied borrowers”—firms that actually applied for credit and were turned 
down. Yet many “discouraged borrowers” more closely resemble “approved borrowers”—firms 
that applied for and received credit—than “denied borrowers.”   
 In this study, we analyze these four groups of firms to shed new light upon how they 
differ. We utilize data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small 
Business Finances (SSBFs) to estimate a sequential set of three logistic regression models, where 
a firm first decides if it need credit (non-borrowers versus all other firms), then decide if it will 
apply for credit (discouraged borrowers versus denied borrowers and accepted borrowers), and, 
finally, learns from its prospective lender whether or not it is extended or denied credit (approved 
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borrowers versus denied borrowers). As the first rigorous evidence on the differences in these 
four groups of firms, results of this study provide policymakers with new insights on how to 
tailor macroeconomic policy and regulations to help small businesses obtain credit when they 
need credit.  
Why is this issue of importance? According to the U.S. Department of Treasury and 
Internal Revenue Service, there are more than 23 million U.S. sole proprietorships, more than 2 
million partnerships with less than $1 million in assets and more than 5 million corporations with 
less than $1 million in assets.”1 Small firms are vital to the U.S. economy. According to the U.S. 
Small Business Administration, they account for half of all U.S. private-sector employment and 
produced more than 60% of net job growth in the U.S. between 1993 and 2008.2 Therefore, a 
better understanding of who needs credit and who gets credit can help policymakers to take 
actions that will lead to more jobs and faster economic growth. 
We contribute to the literature in at least four important ways.  First, we provide the first 
rigorous analysis of the differences in our four types of firms: non-borrowers, discouraged 
borrowers, denied borrowers and approved borrowers. We find that non-borrowers look very 
much like approved borrowers and in ways that are consistent with the pecking-order theory of 
capital structure.3 This is the first rigorous evidence on how this group of firms compares to the 
groups of firms that need credit. We also find that discouraged borrowers are significantly 
different from denied borrowers on a number of dimensions—a result that calls into question the 
                                                 
1 See U.S. Internal Revenue Service statistics at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats. 
 
2 See, “Frequently Asked Questions,” Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration 
(2009). For research purposes, the SBA and Federal Reserve Board define small businesses as 
independent firms with fewer than 500 employees. We follow that definition in this research. 
 
3 Cole (2008) provides strong evidence that privately held U.S. firms follow the pecking-order 
theory of capital structure. 
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results of research that have combined these groups in ways that our results suggest are 
inappropriate, such as pooling discouraged borrowers with denied borrowers in analyzing 
availability of credit.  
Second, we provide an analysis of credit availability that properly accounts for the 
inherent self-selection mechanisms involved in the credit application process: who needs credit, 
who applies for credit conditional upon needing credit, and who receives credit, conditional upon 
applying for credit. Many previous researchers have ignored firms that do not apply for credit; 
have pooled firms that do not need credit with those needing credit; and/or have pooled 
discouraged borrowers with denied borrowers. Hence, our results shed new light upon the credit-
allocation process. 
Third, we provide evidence from the 2003 SSBF on the availability of credit to small 
businesses. This survey includes methodological improvements on the previous SSBFs (1987, 
1993 and 1998) that enable us to better address the issue of availability of credit to small firms. 
One of the most important is the identification of applications to renew existing lines of credit, 
which enables us, for the first time, to differentiate the availability of new credit from renewals 
of existing credit. This turns out to be very important because renewals of existing lines of credit 
account for about 40 percent of all applications, but only about 10 percent of all denials; in other 
words, new applications are turned down at four times the rate of renewals. Our results indicate 
that inclusion of these renewals does not qualitatively affect our results, providing support for 
previous works using the 1993 SSBF, which did not allow researchers to disentangle this effect, 
and the 1998 SSBF, which excluded renewals altogether. 
Fourth, we provide the first comprehensive evidence from the three SSBFs on the 
availability of credit to minority-owned firms. Previous researchers have analyzed data from the 
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1993 and 1998 SSBFs separately, and there are no studies of which we are aware that analyze the 
2003 SSBF, for evidence on how minority-owned firms fare relative to white-owned firms in 
their applications for credit, nor are we aware of any studies that analyze each of the three SSBFs 
for which loan approval data are available for commonalities across time and credit regimes. We 
provide strong evidence across each of the three SSBFs that minority-owned firms are denied 
credit at significantly higher rates than non-minority firms, even after controlling for the wide 
array of control variables available from the SSBFs.4
 In section 2, we briefly review the literature on the availability of credit, followed by a 
description of our date in section 3 and our methodology in section 4. Our results appear in 
section 5 and we provide a summary and conclusions in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 The issue of availability of credit to small businesses has been studied by financial 
economists for at least sixty years, dating back at least to Wendt (1946), who examines 
availability of loans to small businesses in California. Since then, scores of articles have 
addressed this issue. We will limit our review of the literature to the most prominent studies 
using SSBF data that have appeared in the financial economics literature during the past two 
decades. 
 A large body of research has developed around the seminal work of Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) who were the first to analyze credit availability using data from the Survey of Small 
Business Finance. This body has focused on the importance of firm-lender relationships in the 
                                                 
4 Of course, there remain numerous potentially important explanatory variables, such as those 
related to culture and family endowments, which prevent us from interpreting our results as 
definitive evidence of discrimination against minority-owned firms. 
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allocation of credit. Because of the relative opacity of small firms, those firms with stronger 
relationships with their prospective lenders are more likely to receive credit. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) use data from the 1987 SSBF to find that close ties with creditors lead to greater 
availability of credit at lower rates of interest. 
 Berger and Udell (1995) were the first to extend Petersen and Rajan, also using data from 
the 1987 SSBF. These authors focused their analysis only on lines of credit—a type of lending 
where relationships should be especially important. They find that loan rates are lower when 
firms have longer pre-existing relationships. 
 Cole (1998) was the first to analyze data from the 1993 SSBF. He focuses on the lender’s 
decision whether or not to extend credit, rather than on the rate charged by the lender, and finds 
that it is the existence, rather than the length, of the firm-lender relationship that affects the 
likelihood a lender will extend credit. 
 Several studies have used SSBF data to analyze how race and gender influence the 
availability of credit.  Cavalluzo and Cavalluzo (1998) use data from the 1987 SSBF to find little 
variation in credit availability by gender but significant differences by race. Cavalluzzo, 
Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002) use data from the 1993 SSBF to find significant differences in 
availability of credit by race. Blanchflower et al. (2004) use data from the 1993 and also find 
significant differences by race. Also using data from the 1993 SSBF, Coleman (2003) finds that 
black small businesses were less likely to even apply for a loan because they expected to be 
turned down, i.e., that they were more likely to be a discouraged borrower as well as more likely 
to be a denied borrower. Most recently, Cavalluzo and Wolken (2005) use data from the 1998 
SSBF, which provides information on personal wealth, an important omitted variable in earlier 
analysis, yet also find significant differences in credit availability by race.  
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Chakraborty and Hu (2006) use data from the 1993 SSBF to analyze how relationships 
affect lender’s decision to secure lines of credit and other types of loans. They find that the 
length of relationship decreases the likelihood of collateral for a line of credit but not for other 
types of loans. Previously, Berger and Udell (1995) had shown that longer relationships reduced 
the likelihood of collateral being required for lines of credit, using data from the 1987 SSBF. 
 
3. Data 
 To conduct this study, we use data from the Federal Reserve Board’s 1993, 1998 and 
2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance (“SSBF”).5 In each survey, the firms surveyed 
constitute a nationally representative sample of small businesses operating in the U.S. as the 
survey year and at the time of the interviews, which took place during the following year, where 
a small business is defined as a non-financial, non-farm enterprise employing fewer than 500 
employees. The survey data for each year are broadly representative of approximately five 
million firms operating in the U.S. as of the survey year.  
 The SSBF provides detailed information about each firm's most recent borrowing 
experience. This includes whether or not the firm applied for credit and, if the firm did not apply, 
did it fail to apply because it feared its application would be rejected (discouraged borrowers). 
For firms that applied, the SSBF provides information on the identity and characteristics of the 
potential lender to which the firm applied, other financial services (if any) that the firm obtained 
from that potential lender, and whether the potential lender approved or denied the firm’s credit 
                                                 
5  We do not analyze data from the 1987 SSBF because it does not provide information on non-
borrowers, discourage borrowers or denied borrowers. See Elliehausen and Wolken (1990) for a 
detailed description of the 1987 survey, Cole and Wolken (1995) for a detailed description of the 
1993 survey, Bitler, Robb and Wolken (2001) for a detailed description of the 1998 survey, and 
Mach and Wolken (2006) for a detailed description of the 2003 survey. 
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application. The survey data also provide information on each firm’s balance sheet and income 
statement; its credit history; the firm's characteristics, including standard industrial classification 
(SIC), organizational form, and age; and demographic characteristics of each firm's primary 
owner, including age, education, experience, and credit history. Balance-sheet and income-
statement data are derived from the enterprise's year-end financial statements. Credit history, 
firm characteristics, and demographic characteristics of each firm's primary owner are taken as of 
year-end. 
 We impose a number of restrictions on the SSBFs. First, we exclude the very small 
number of firms reporting that they were publicly traded in order to focus exclusively on 
privately held firms. Second, we exclude firms reporting assets or sales greater than $10 million 
(some as large as $200 million) because we wish to focus on truly “small” firms; we choose the 
$10 million threshold because this is the typical cut-off used by bankers to differentiate “small” 
businesses from “middle-market” businesses. 6 Third, we exclude firms reporting that no owner 
controlled at least ten percent of the firm’s shares because, for these firms, the SSBF does not 
collect information on the primary owner, such as age, education and personal wealth. Fourth, 
we exclude firms reporting that another business is the primary owner of the firm because, again, 
the SSBF does not collect information about the primary owner of such firms. Finally, we 
exclude firms reporting zero assets, as we need a positive value of assets to scale our financial 
variables. These restrictions leave us with our final samples for 1993/1998/2003. 
 
                                                 
6 Results obtained when these larger firms are included in the analysis are not qualitatively  
different from those obtained under this sample restriction. 
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4. Methodology and Hypotheses 
4.1 Methodology 
In order to provide new evidence on who needs credit and who gets credit among small 
businesses, we employ both univariate and multivariate tests. In all of our tests, we use the 
survey sampling weights because the SSBFs are not simple random samples; rather, they are 
stratified random samples, where large and minority-owned firms are over-represented relative to 
smaller and white-owned firms. Failure to account for this non-random sampling would impair 
our ability to make inferences from our analysis of sample firms to the target population of U.S. 
small businesses. 
First, we classify firms into one of four categories of Borrower Type based upon their 
responses to questions regarding their most recent loan request during the previous three years.7
Non-Borrower: the firm did not apply for a loan during the previous three years because 
 the firm did not need credit.8
Discouraged Borrower: the firm did not apply for a loan during the previous year 
because the firm feared rejection, even though it needed credit. 
Denied Borrower: the firm did apply for a loan during the previous three years but 
 was denied credit by its prospective lender(s). 
                                                 
7 Each firm is asked about its most recent applications (approved and/or denied) during the 
previous three years, excluding applications for credit cards, loans from owners and trade credit 
with suppliers, as well as applications that were withdrawn or were pending at the time of the 
interview. Applications for renewals of credit lines were included. We test the impact of their 
inclusion in Table 5. 
 
8 Note that most of these firms borrowed funds more than three years before the survey, so that 
they do report outstanding debt in their capital structure. 
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Approved Borrower: the firm did apply for a loan during the previous three years and 
 was granted credit by its prospective lender(s). 
Once we have classified our sample firms, we calculate descriptive statistics for each 
group of firms and test for significant differences across categories. We also conduct multivariate 
tests on the data, estimating a sequence of logistic regression models that explain the sequential 
selection of the loan application and approval process (Figure 1). First, a firm decides whether or 
not it needs credit. We include firms from all four groups in this analysis, and define Need Credit 
as equal to zero for non-borrowers and a value of one to all other firms (Discouraged Borrowers, 
Denied Borrowers and Approved Borrowers).  
Need Credit =  
f (firm characteristics, market characteristics, owner characteristics,  
firm-creditor relationship characteristics)          (1) 
Second, a firm that needs credit decides whether or not to apply for credit. We exclude 
Non-Borrowers from this model and define Apply for Credit as equal to zero for Discouraged 
Borrowers and equal to one for firms in one of the two groups that applied for credit (Denied 
Borrowers and Approved Borrowers). 
Apply for Credit =  
f (firm characteristics, market characteristics, owner characteristics,  
firm-creditor relationship characteristics)          (2) 
Third, a firm that decides to apply for credit is either approved or denied credit. In this 
stage of the model, we include only those firms that applied for credit and define Get Credit as 
equal to zero for Denied Borrowers and equal to one for Approved Borrowers. 
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Get Credit =  
f (firm characteristics, market characteristics, owner characteristics,  
firm-creditor relationship characteristics)          (1) 
 
Figure 1: 
Who needs and who gets credit? 
A sequential model 
(1) 
Need 
Credit? 
(2) 
Apply for 
Credit? 
(3) 
Get 
Credit? 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Non-Borrower 
Discouraged 
Borrower 
Denied 
Borrower 
Approved 
Borrower 
 
We estimate this three-step sequential model using a univariate probit model at step 1 and 
using a bivariate probit selection model (see Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981) and Greene 
(1992) and (1996)) at steps 2 and 3. This selection model is an extension of the bivariate probit 
model, which itself is an extension of the univariate probit model. We use a probit model 
because our dependent variables are binary (i.e., they take on a value of zero or one), so that 
ordinary least squares is inappropriate. We use a bivariate probit selection model at steps 2 and 3 
in order to account for a non-random selection mechanism operating on those firms that need 
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credit and on those firms that applied for credit. We cannot use the standard Heckman (1979) 
selection model because our the dependent variable in our second equation is binary; in 
Heckman’s model, the dependent variable in the second equation is continuous and can be 
estimated by ordinary least squares. The bivariate probit model consists of two equations 
y*1 = β1 ' x1 + є1, y1 = sign(y*1)      (1) 
and 
y*2 = β2 ' x2 + є2, y2 = sign(y*2)      (2) 
where: 
є1, є2 ~ Bivariate Normal(0,0,1,1,ρ) 
In the bivariate probit selection model, [y1, x1] are only observed when y2 is equal to one, so the 
error terms in eq. (1) and eq. (2) must be re-specified as єj = exp(γj , zj) uj, where [u1, u2] have the 
bivariate standard normal distribution. The estimated correlation coefficient ρ (the correlation 
between error terms є1 and є2) can be used to test for selection bias. If ρ is statistically significant, 
then we can reject the null hypothesis that selection bias is not present. 
 In our particular setting, our selection equation at step 2 is the Need Credit equation, 
explaining who needs credit, and our primary equation of interest is the Apply for Credit 
equation. At step 3, our selection equation is the Apply for Credit equation and our primary 
equation of interest is the Get Credit equation. We estimate these models using the LIMDEP 
statistical package. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses 
For explanatory variables, we generally follow the existing literature on the availability 
of credit, which hypothesizes that a lender is more likely to extend credit to a firm when that firm 
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shares characteristics of other firms that historically have been most likely to repay their credits.9 
We expect that the same set of characteristics should explain Non-Borrowers relative to Need-
Credit firms and Applied-for-Credit firms relative to Discouraged Borrower, as well as 
Approved Borrowers relative to Denied Borrowers. 
We include a vector of firm characteristics, a vector of market characteristics, a vector of 
owner characteristics, and a vector of firm-lender relationship characteristics. 
 
4.2.1 Firm Characteristics 
Firm characteristics include public reputation as proxied by firm age; firm size as 
measured by annual sales; firm leverage as measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets; firm profitability as measured by return on assets; firm liquid assets as measured by the 
ratio of cash to total assets;10 organizational form as measured by dummy variables for C-
Corporations, S-Corporations, Partnerships and Proprietorships; firm credit quality as proxied 
by the number of obligations on which the firm has been 60 or more days delinquent during the 
previous three years, whether the firm had declared bankruptcy in the past seven years, and a 
categorical representation of the D&B credit score;11 and firm industrial classification as 
measured by a set of dummy variables for one- or two-digit SIC code. 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Cole (1998) and Cole, Goldberg and White (2004). 
 
10 Financial ratios are winsorized at the 99th percentiles to mitigate the effects of large outliers on 
the results. Results obtained when these observations are deleted rather than winsorized are not 
qualitatively different. 
 
11 The SSBF variable for the 2003 D&B Credit Score ranges from 1 to 6, with a higher number 
indicating better credit quality. For 1998, the SSBF variable for the D&B Credit Score ranges 
from 1 to 5, with a higher number indicating worse credit quality. The 1993 SSBF does not 
provide this variable. 
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Older firms are thought to be more creditworthy because they have survived the high-risk 
start-up period in a firm’s life cycle and, over time, have developed a public track record that ca 
be scrutinized by a prospective lender. Larger firms are thought to be more creditworthy because 
they tend to be better established and typically are more diversified than smaller firms.  More 
profitable firms are thought to be more creditworthy because they have demonstrated their ability 
to cover future debt service out of earnings. Firms with more liquid assets are thought to be more 
creditworthy because they are more likely to be able to meet their current financial obligations. 
Proprietorships are thought to be more creditworthy than partnerships and corporations, 
ceteris paribus, because a lender can seize the owner’s personal assets, as well as business assets, 
to satisfy a claim. Similarly, partnerships are thought to be more creditworthiness than 
corporations because a lender can seize the general partner’s personal assets, in addition to the 
firm’s business assets, in order to satisfy a claim. We have no expectations about the relative 
creditworthiness of S-corporations relative to C-corporations. 
Firms with more delinquent business obligations, firms that have declared bankruptcy 
during the previous seven years and firms with worse D&B credit scores are thought to be less 
creditworthy because they have a demonstrated history of being unable to meet their previous 
financial obligations. Firms in certain industries, such as construction, manufacturing and 
transportation, are thought to be more creditworthy because they typically have more tangible 
assets that can be pledged as collateral than do firms in other industries, such as business services 
and professional services. 
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4.2.2 Market Characteristics 
Market characteristics are as measured by three dummy variables for low, medium and 
high concentration as measured by a bank Herfindahl Index and a dummy for firms located in 
Urban rather than rural areas. We are severely limited with respect to available market 
characteristics because confidentiality concerns preclude the SSBF from providing the location 
of sample firms beyond Census region. However, the SSBF does provide a categorical variable 
indicating banking-market concentration, and a dummy variable indicating a firm located within 
an MSA. 
We expect that firms would be less likely to be able to obtain credit in less competitive 
banking markets. To the extent that this variable does not completely capture variation in 
banking competition, we expect that firms in rural markets also would be less likely to be able to 
obtain credit, as these markets tend to be less competitive. 
 
4.2.3 Owner Characteristics  
Our vector of owner characteristics includes owner’s reputation as measured by age, 
years of business experience and dummy variables for educational attainment (high school, some 
college, college degree or graduate degree); the race, ethnicity and gender of the controlling 
owner as measured by dummy variables for Black-, Hispanic-, Asian- and Female-owned firms; 
the primary owner’s credit quality as measured by the number of credit obligations on which the 
owner has been 60 or more days delinquent during the past three years, a dummy indicating 
whether the owner has declared bankruptcy during the past seven years, and a dummy indicating 
whether a judgment has been rendered against the owner within the past three years; and two 
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measures of the owner’s personal wealth: the value of any home equity and the net worth of the 
owner, excluding home equity and equity in the firm.12
 Firms with older owners are expected to be more creditworthy because older owners are 
thought to be wiser and have longer track records than younger owners. Firms with more 
experienced owners are thought to be more creditworthy because they have a longer track record 
in the firm’s line of business. Firms with more educated owners are thought to be more 
creditworthy because more educated owners are thought to be better equipped to successfully run 
a business.  
We have no expectations regarding indicators for firms with minority controlling owners 
(Asian, Black, Female or Hispanic). We include these variables in an effort to ascertain whether 
minority-owned firms are experiencing disparate outcomes in the credit markets relative to firms 
whose controlling owners are white, non-Hispanic males. 
Firms whose controlling owners have more delinquent personal obligations, have 
declared bankruptcy during the previous seven years, or have suffered a judgment against them 
during the previous three years are thought to be less creditworthy because they have a 
demonstrated history of being unable to meet their previous personal credit obligations. Finally, 
firms whose controlling owners have greater personal wealth are thought to be more 
creditworthy because they have more personal assets that can be pledged as collateral against 
firm borrowings. 
 
                                                 
12 The 1993 SSBF does not include information on these two wealth variables. 
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4.2.4 Firm-Lender Relationship Characteristics 
Our fourth and final vector of firm-lender relationship characteristics includes variables 
that measure the strength of the firm’s relationship with its primary financial institution (“FI”): 
the length of the relationship, the distance between the firm and its primary FI, and a set of 
dummy variables indicating the types of pre-existing relationships with the primary FI: checking 
account, savings account, and/or financial management service). We also include dummy 
variables indicating if the primary FI is a commercial bank, a savings bank or some other type of 
FI. Finally, we include the total number of financial institutions from which the firm obtains any 
financial service, which we further disaggregate into commercial banks and non-banks. 
 Creditors are expected to look more favorably upon loan applications from firms with 
which they have had longer relationships because the creditors have more private information 
about the prospective borrower gleaned from the relationship, such as account balances and 
payment histories. A creditor is expected to favor firms located closer to the creditor because the 
creditor can more easily monitor firms in the nearby market areas. Creditors are expected to 
favor firms with which they have pre-existing checking, savings or financial management 
relationships because a creditor can use these relationships to gather valuable private information 
about the firm’s creditworthiness. 
 The type of primary financial institution chosen by a firm is expected to influence the 
availability of credit to that firm. Specialized lenders such as finance companies and savings 
associations typically make only specialized loans such as mortgages or asset-back loans such as 
equipment loans. If private information developed by the primary financial institution is valuable 
in allocating credit, then firms choosing such specialized lenders as their primary source of 
financial services will be at a disadvantage when applying for types of credit other than those in 
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which the primary lender specializes. Finally, firms that obtain financial services from more 
financial institutions have a wider set of potential lenders that have developed valuable private 
information about the firm and should be more likely to be able to obtain credit when needed. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics: Firms that Need Credit versus Firms that Do Not Need Credit 
 For each of the three SSBFs, Table 1 presents weighted descriptive statistics for the full 
sample, and then, separately, for firms that Need credit and for firms that have No Need for 
credit., along with a t-test for differences in means of these two groups. First, we will discuss the 
full-sample means and then we will discuss the differences in the means of the Need and No-
Need firms.  
 
5.1.1 Firm Characteristics  
Average firm size as measured by annual sales declined from $566 thousand in 1993 to 
$529 thousand in 1998 before rising to $624 thousand in 2003. Size as measured by total assets 
exhibited a similar trend, falling from $278 thousand in 1993 to $249 thousand in 1998 before 
rising to $307 thousand in 2003. Size as measured by employment was less variable, rising from 
6.78 in 1993 to 7.01 in 1998 and 7.02 in 2003. 
Profitability as measured by return on assets ranged from 61 percent in 2003 to 88 
percent in 1998. Leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ranged from  0.559 in 
1993 to 0.845 in 2003. The ratio of cash to assets rose from 0.197 in 1993 to 0.257 in 2003. 
Organizational form changed dramatically from 1993 to 2003, with S-corporations 
gaining in popularity at the expense of C-corporations. In 1993, 28 percent of the firms were 
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organized as C-corporations and 20 percent as S-corporations, but by 2003, S-corporations 
accounted for 31 percent of the sample while C-corporations accounted for only 14 percent. The 
portion of firms organized as proprietorships and partnerships remained relatively constant at 
about 46 percent and 8 percent, respectively. 
The average firm had been in business for thirteen to fourteen years. Between 14 and 19 
percent of the firms reported at least one delinquent business obligation and between 25 and 36 
percent reported paying late on trade credit. The percent of firms reporting previous bankruptcy 
during the previous seven years (not collected for 1993) was 2.3 percent in 1998 and 1.0 percent 
in 2003. The average D&B score for 1998 was 2.99, where 1 indicates low risk, 3 indicates 
medium risk and 5 indicates high risk. The average D&B score for 2003 was 3.6, where 1 
indicates high risk and 6 indicates low risk.  
Use of business credit cards rose from 29 percent in 1993 to  47 percent in 1998 and 
2003. Use of personal credit cards for business purposes fell from 41 percent in 1993 to 34 
percent in 1998 and then rose to 48 percent in 2003.  
By industry, 20-25 percent of the firms are in business services, 17-21 percent are in 
professional services, and 19-22 percent are in retail trade. Business and professional services 
saw the greatest increases from 1993-2003 whereas Transportation and Primary Manufacturing 
saw the greatest declines. 
 Most of the firm characteristics are significantly different for the subsamples of firms that 
Need credit (discouraged, denied and approved) and firms that have No Need for credit. Need 
firms are: much larger as measured by sales, assets and employment; less profitable; more highly 
levered; hold less cash; are younger; are much less likely to be organized as proprietorships and 
more likely to be organized as S- or C-Corporations. Need firms have inferior credit quality on 
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all four measures—business bankruptcy, delinquent business obligations, D&B credit score and 
trade credit paid late. Finally, Need firms are significantly more likely to use both personal and 
business credit cards for business purposes.  
In 1993, near the end of the credit crunch that afflicted the U.S. economy following the 
1990-91 recession, Need firms accounted for 55 percent of the sample, but in 1998, when the 
U.S. was in the middle of a ten-year economic boom cycle, accounted for only 41 percent of the 
sample. During 2003, as the economy was recovering from 9/11 and the 2001-2002 recession, 
Need firms accounted for 49 percent of the sample. 
 
5.1.2 Market Characteristics 
 Almost 80 percent of the firms are located in Urban areas and just under half are located 
in highly concentrated banking markets. None of the market characteristics are consistently 
significant in explaining differences in firms that need credit and those that do not need credit. 
 
5.1.3 Primary Owner Characteristics 
 The average primary owner was 49-52 years old with 18-20 years of experience. and had 
at least a college education. Between 18-20 percent had a graduate degree and another 26-30 
percent had a college degree. By race, ethnicity and gender, 3-4 percent of the primary owners 
were Black, 3-4 percent were Asian, 4-6 percent were Hispanic and 21-26 percent were female. 
Only 1-3 percent of the owners had declared bankruptcy during the previous seven years and 
only 2-5 percent reported a judgment against themselves during the previous three years. On 
average, 12-14 percent of the firm owners had at least one delinquent personal obligation. The 
 - 19 -
average value of the owner’s net worth (excluding the value of the firm) was $500 thousand -
$700 thousand.  
 As with firm characteristics, most of the primary owner characteristics are significantly 
different for the groups of firms that need and don’t need credit across all three SSBFs. Firms 
that need credit are significantly younger, less experienced and less educated; and have 
significantly worse credit quality by all measures—owner bankruptcy, owner delinquencies, and 
owner judgments. They also have significantly less owner personal wealth. Finally, they are 
significantly more likely to be Black and Hispanic but not Asian or Female. 
 
5.1.4 Relationship Characteristics 
 The vast majority of firms (80-82 percent) designate a commercial bank as their primary 
source of financial services, with 10-13 percent designating a savings association and the 
remainder designating some other source. The average length of the firm’s relationship with its 
primary source is between 8-10 years 95-124 months) and the average distance from the firm and 
its primary source is 14-33 miles. The average firm obtained financial services from 1.2 
commercial banks and from 0.8-1.1 non-bank financial institutions.  
Firms that need credit were significantly more likely to designate a finance company as 
their primary financial institution, had significantly shorter lengths of relationships with their 
primary financial institution, and had significantly fewer bank and nonbank sources of financial 
services. 
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics: Discouraged Firms versus Firms that Applied for Credit 
 For each of the three SSBFs, Table 2 presents weighted descriptive statistics for the full  
sample of firms indicating that they needed credit and, separately, for Discouraged Firms and 
Applied Firms (firms that applied for credit), along with a t-test for differences in means of these 
two groups.  
5.2.1 Firm Characteristics  
When compared with Applied Firms, we find that Discouraged Firms are significantly 
smaller, more highly levered, have more cash, are less likely to be organized as corporations and 
more likely to be organized as proprietorships, are younger and have worse credit quality as 
measured by firm bankruptcy, firm delinquent obligations and D&B Credit Score. Discouraged 
Firms are significantly less likely to use personal credit cards for business purposes  
5.2.2 Market Characteristics 
When we examine market characteristics, we find that Discouraged Firms are 
significantly more likely to be located in an MSA, but we find no consistent differences by 
banking market concentration. 
5.2.3 Owner Characteristics 
When compared with Applied Firms, Discouraged Firms have controlling owners that 
are younger, have less experience and less education, are more likely to be Black and Female, 
have worse credit quality as measured by owner bankruptcy and owner delinquent obligations, 
and have less personal wealth. 
5.2.4 Firm-Creditor Relationship Characteristics 
When compared with Applied firms, Discouraged Firms are less likely to designate a 
commercial bank as their primary source of financial services, have significantly shorter 
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relationships with their primary sources, and obtain financial services from significantly fewer 
sources, both commercial bank and nonbank. 
 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics: Discouraged Firms versus Denied Firms 
 In Table 3 are descriptive statistics for Discouraged Firms and Denied Firms, along with 
t-statistics for tests of differences in means of these two groups. When compared with Denied 
Firms, we find that Discouraged Firms are significantly smaller, more profitable, hold more 
cash, are less likely to be organized as corporations and more likely to be organized as 
proprietorships, are younger, are less likely to use business credit cards, and are less likely to pay 
late on trade credit. Owners of Discouraged Firms are more likely to be Black and Female, are 
more likely to have declared bankruptcy; and have less personal wealth. Discouraged Firms 
obtain financial services from significantly fewer commercial bank and nonbank sources.  
In summary, we find a number of significant differences in Discouraged Firms and 
Denied Firms in variables typically used to measure the availability of credit. This finding argues 
against pooling these two groups in any study of the availability of credit. 
 
5.4 Descriptive Statistics: Approved Firms versus Denied Firms 
For each of the three SSBFs, Table 4 presents weighted descriptive statistics for the full  
sample of firms that applied for credit and, separately, for Denied Firms (firms that applied for 
credit and whose applications were denied) and Approved Firms (firms that applied for credit 
and whose applications were approved), along with a t-test for differences in means of these two 
groups.  
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When compared with Approved Firms, we find that Denied Firms are significantly 
smaller; are more highly levered; are less likely to be C-Corporations and more likely to be 
Proprietorships; are younger; and have lower credit quality as measured by business 
bankruptcies, firm delinquencies, D&B score and Trade Credit Paid Late.  
Denied Firms are significantly more likely to be located in urban areas. Owners of 
Denied Firms are significantly younger; are less experienced; are less educated; are more likely 
to be Black; have significantly lower credit quality as measured by owner bankruptcy, owner 
delinquencies and owner judgments; and have less personal wealth.  
A Denied Firm is significantly more likely to use a commercial bank and less likely to 
use a finance company when applying for its most recent loan application; has a much shorter 
relationship with the source of its most recent loan application; is less likely to obtain checking, 
savings and other financial services from the institution where it made its most recent loan 
application. In general, most of these results are consistent with those found in previous studies 
that analyzed data only from the 1993 SSBF.  
 
5.5 Multivariate Analysis 
 Tables 5, 6, and 8 present the results from estimating the three sequential logistic 
regression models described in Section IV: Firms that need credit versus firms that don’t need 
credit (Table 5); Discouraged firms versus firms that applied for credit (Table 6); and Approved 
firms versus Denied Firms (Table 8). Table 7 presents results for Discouraged versus Denied 
firms. 
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5.5.1 Firms that Don’t Need Credit 
 In Table 5 are the results from estimating a weighted probit regression model where the 
dependent variable Need Credit is equal to one if the firm indicated that it did not need credit 
(Non-Borrowers) and equal to zero otherwise (including Discouraged Firms, Denied Firms and 
Approved Firms). For each variable, the table shows the marginal effect and the associated 
t-statistic.  
This analysis reveals that Non-Borrower firms are significantly smaller; are more 
profitable; are less levered; are more liquid (holding more cash); are less likely to be organized 
as corporations and more likely to be organized as proprietorships; are older; have higher credit 
quality as measured by firm bankruptcy, firm delinquencies, D&B credit score and trade credit 
paid late. In general, these findings are consistent with the pecking-order theory of capital 
structure.  
Non-Borrower firms are more likely to be located in MSAs.  
Owners of Non-Borrower firms are older; are less likely to be Black; have higher credit 
quality as measured by owner bankruptcy, owner delinquencies, and owner judgments; and have 
greater owner personal wealth.  
Non-Borrower firms are less likely to designate a finance company as their primary 
source of financial services; have longer relationships with their primary source of financial 
services. Finally, they use significantly fewer sources of financial services, both bank and non-
bank. 
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5.5.2 Discouraged Borrowers 
 In Table 6 are the results from the second stage of a bivariate probit selection model 
where Apply for Credit is equal to one if the firm indicated that it needed credit but was 
discouraged and did not apply for credit (Discouraged) and equal to zero if it applied for credit 
(Denied firms and Approved firms). We do not present or discuss the selection equation Need 
Credit because it is fundamentally identical to the equation in Table 5 and the estimated 
correlation coefficient is not significantly different from zero.  
 Our analysis reveals that, when compared to Applied firms, Discouraged firms are 
significantly smaller; have worse credit quality as measured by firm delinquencies and D&B 
Credit Score; and are more likely to be located in urban areas.  
Owners of Discouraged firms are significantly younger; have worse credit quality as 
measured by owner bankruptcy and owner delinquencies; and have less owner personal wealth. 
Discouraged firms use fewer sources of financial services—both bank and non-bank. 
 In Table 7 are the results from the second stage of a bivariate probit selection model 
where Denied Credit is equal zero if the firm indicated that it needed credit but was discouraged 
and did not apply for credit (Discouraged Firms) and equal to one if the firm applied for but was 
denied credit (Denied Firms). Discouraged firms are significantly smaller, more profitable, and 
older.  
 The owners of Discouraged firms are significantly younger.  
 Discouraged firms use significantly fewer sources of financial services—both bank and 
nonbank. 
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5.5.3 Approved Borrowers 
 In Table 8 are the results from the second stage of a bivariate probit selection model 
where Get Credit is equal to one if the firm indicated that it applied for and was extended credit 
(Approved firms) and equal to zero if it applied for credit but was turned down (Denied firms). 
Results for the selection equation Applied for Credit are not presented because they are virtually 
identical to the results in Table 6 and because the estimated correlation coefficient between error 
terms in the two equations is not significantly different from zero.  
 This analysis reveals that Approved firms are significantly larger and more profitable; and 
have significantly better credit quality as measured by firm bankruptcy, firm delinquencies and 
D&B credit scores.  
The owners of Approved Firms are less likely to be Black; and have higher credit quality 
as measured by owner bankruptcy, owner delinquencies and owner judgments.  
Approved Firms are significantly more likely to apply for their most recent loan at a 
potential source that is other than a commercial bank or savings association, to obtain financial 
services from significantly fewer non-banks, and to apply for a mortgage, motor vehicle loan or 
equipment loan—each of which provides collateral for the lender. 
 Our results regarding the creditworthiness of both the firm and its primary owner have 
important implications for the growing literature on credit scoring. Berger, Cowan, and Frame 
(2008) report that banks using credit scoring to evaluate small business loan applications are 
significantly more likely to use consumer credit scores rather than small business credit scores, 
but very few banks use both credit scores. Our results suggest that both types of credit scores are 
useful in evaluating small business loan applications. 
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5.5.4 Renewals of Credit Lines 
 A significant portion of the most recent loan applications are, in fact, applications to 
renew an existing line of credit. There are 573 such renewal applications, which make up almost 
40 percent of the total applications, but only 8 percent of denials. In order to see if these renewal 
applications are driving our results (and those of previous studies using the earlier SSBFs, which 
did not enable researchers to distinguish between renewal applications and new applications), we 
rerun our analysis, excluding these 573 renewal applications. (There are too few denials to 
perform a meaningful analysis of renewal applications by themselves.) The results are 
qualitatively unchanged by the exclusion of the line-of-credit renewal applications. Each variable 
that is significant when they are included remains significant when they are excluded. In fact, 
significance levels often increase when the renewal applications are excluded. 
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this study, we analyze data from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business 
Finance for new evidence regarding the availability of credit to small and minority-owned firms. 
We make at least four significant contributions to the literature on the availability of credit.  
First, we provide the first rigorous analysis of the differences in our four types of firms: 
non-borrowers, discouraged borrowers, denied borrowers and successful borrowers. Our findings 
have important implications for interpreting previous research that has combined these groups in 
ways that our results suggest are inappropriate, such as pooling discouraged borrowers with 
denied borrowers in analyzing availability of credit. 
Second, we provide an analysis of credit availability that properly accounts for the 
inherent self-selection mechanisms involved in the credit application process: who needs credit, 
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who applies for credit conditional upon needing credit, and who receives credit, conditional upon 
applying for credit. Previous researchers have pooled firms that do not need credit with those 
needing credit and have pooled discouraged borrowers with denied borrowers. Hence, our results 
shed new light upon the credit-allocation process.  
Third, we provide new evidence on the availability of credit to minority-owned firms by 
examining three SSBFs spanning  more than a decade during which the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) became increasingly important in the regulation of depository 
institutions. We find that, in each of the three SSBFs, Black-owned firms are disproportionately 
turned down when applying for credit. Our results indicate that Black-owned firms are 10 to 18 
percent more likely to be rejected than other firms, even after incorporating the increasingly 
extensive set of control variables available from the SSBFs. Moreover, this percentage has 
increased, rather than decreased with each successive SSBF. 
Fourth, we provide new evidence from the 2003 SSBF on the availability of credit to 
small firms. This survey includes methodological improvements on the previous SSBFs (1987, 
1993 and 1998) that enable us to better address the issue of availability of credit to small firms. 
One of the most important is the identification of applications to renew existing lines of credit, 
which enables us for the first time to differentiate the availability of new credit from renewals of 
existing credit.  
This study  provides both academics and policymakers with new insights on how to tailor 
regulations to help small businesses obtain needed credit and reach their optimal capital 
structures. Of especial interest is the new evidence brought to light by the sequential model of 
the credit application process regarding why a significant percentage of firms choose not to 
borrow—the non-borrowers and the discouraged borrowers. This is critically important because 
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evidence from the SSBFs reveals almost half of all firms do not appear to “need” credit and that 
as many as one out of seven small firms has a negative ratio of debt to equity because their debt 
exceeds their assets. Theory suggests that poorly capitalized firms are less likely to hire new 
employees or make new long-term investments that could improve economic growth, so policies 
that help these firms improve their capitalization should lead to higher growth in both 
employment and output (GDP). Our evidence suggests that a significant portion of the 
“discouraged” firms would be successful in obtaining credit if only they would apply. 
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Appendix Table 1 Panel A: 
Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances. 
Variable
 
Firm Characteristics
Sales Annual Sales Revenues
Assets Total Assets
Employment Number of Employees
ln(Assets) Natural Logarithm of Total Assets
ROA Return on Assets (Net Income divided by Total Assets), winsorized at 99th percentiles
Liabilities to Assets Total Liabilities to Total Assets
Cash to Assets Cash to Total Assets
C-Corp Firm is Organized as a C-Corporation
S-Corp Firm is Organized as an S-Corporation
Partnership Firm is Organized as a Partnership
Firm Age Number of Years since the Firm was Founded, Purchased or Acquired
Bus Bankruptcy Firm declared Bankrupcy During Past Seven Years
Bus Delinquencies Firm was Delinquent on a Business Obligation During the Previous Three Years
D&B Bus Credit Score Dun&Bradstreet Credit Score converted to Categorical Variable
Use Bus Credit Card Firm Uses Business Credit Card to Pay Business Expenses
Use Own Credit Card Firm Uses Owner's Personal Credit Card to Pay Business Expenses
Trade Credit Paid Late Firm Paid Late on Trade Credit During the Previous Three Years
Industry
SIC 1 Firm is in Construction & Mining
SIC 2 Firm is in Primary Manufacturing
SIC 3 Firm is in Secondary Manufacturing
SIC 4 Firm is in Transportation
SIC 51 Firm is in Wholesale Sales
SIC 52 Firm is in Retail Sales
SIC 6 Firm is in Finance or Real Estate (Financial Institutions are excluded from the SSBFs)
SIC 7 Firm is in Business Services
SIC 8 Firm is in Professional Services
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Appendix Table 1 Panel B:  
Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances. 
Variable
Market Characteristics
MSA Firm is located in a Metropolitan Statistical Area
HHI High Firm is located in a Banking Market with High Herfindahl Concentration Ratio
HHI Medium Firm is located in a Banking Market with a Medium Herfindahl Concentration Ratio
Owner Characteristics
Owner Age Age of the Primary Owner
Owner Experience Years of Experience of the Primary Owner
Owner Graduate Degree Primary Owner has a Graduate Degree
Owner College Degree Primary Owner has a College Degree
Owner Some College Primary Owner Attended College
Black Owner Primary Owner is Black
Asian Owner Primary Owner is Asian
Hispanic Owner Primary Owner is Hispanic
Female Owner Primary Owner is Female
Owner Bankruptcy Primary Owner has declared Bankruptcy During Past Seven Years
Owner Delinquencies Primary Owner has been delinquent on Personal Obligations During Past Three Years
Owner Judgement Primary Owner has had a Judgment Rendered against her During Past Three Years
Owner Personal Wealth Personal Wealth of Primary Owner
Firm-Creditor Relationships
Primary is Comm Bank Firm's Primary Source of Financial Services is a Commercial Bank
Primary is Savings Assoc Firm's Primary Source of Financial Services is a Savings Association
Primary is Finance Co Firm's Primary Source of Financial Services is a Finance Company
Primary is Other Firm's Primary Source of Financial Services is a Other
Primary Length of Relationship Number of Years that the Firm has had a Relationship with its Primary Source of Financial Services
Primary Distance Distance in miles between the Firm's Primary Location and Location of its Primary Source
Number of Bank Sources Number of Banks from which the Firm Obtains Financial Services
Number of Non-Bank Sources Number of Non-Banks from which the Firm Obtains Financial Services  
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Appendix Table 1 Panel C: 
Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances. 
Variable
Relationship Characteristics:
MRL Source is a Comm Banks Most Recent Loan Source is a Commercial Bank
MRL Source Savings Assoc Most Recent Loan Source is a Savings Association
MRL Source Finance Co Most Recent Loan Source is a Finance Company
MRL Source Other Most Recent Loan Source is Other
MRL Length of Relationship Number of Years that the Firm has had a Relationship with its Most Recent Loan Source
MRL Distance from Firm Distance in miles between the Firm's Primary Location and its Most Recent Loan Source
Number of Bank Sources Number of Bank Sources for Financial Services
Number of Non-Bank Sources Number of Non-Bank Sources for Financial Services
MRL Checking Relationship Firm has a Checking Account at its Most Recent Loan Source
MRL Savings Relationship Firm has a Savings Account at its Most Recent Loan Source
MRL Fin'l Svcs Relationship Firm obtains other Financial Services from its Most Recent Loan Source
MRL Line of Credit Relationship Firm has a Pre-Existing Line of Credit at its Most Recent Loan Source
MRL Loan Relationship Firm has a Pre-Existing Loan at its Most Recent Loan Source
MRL is a Credit Line Most Recent Loan Application was for a New Line of Credit or a Renewal of a Line of Credit
MRL is a New Credit Line Most Recent Loan Application was for a New Line of Credit
MRL is a Lease Most Recent Loan Application was for a Lease
MRL is a Mortgage Most Recent Loan Application was for a Mortgage Loan
MRL is a Motor Vehicle Loan Most Recent Loan Application was for a Motor Vehicle Loan
MRL is an Equipment Loan Most Recent Loan Application was for an Equipment Loan
MRL is an Other Loan Most Recent Loan Application was for Other Loan Type  
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Table 1 Panel A: 
Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample and separately for Firms that Need Credit vs. Firms that have No Need for Credit. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Need Credit firms include those that applied for credit or 
did not apply because they feared rejection. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
No No No 
Variable All Need Need Difference All Need Need Difference All Need Need Difference
Observations 4,162   2,284   1,878   3,185   1,313   1,872   3,623   1,773   1,850   
Firm Characteristics
Sales 566.1   721.0   420.5   300.5   a 528.9   562.0   507.6   54.4    624.3   859.4   438.4   421.0   a
Assets 277.7   357.7   202.5   155.2   a 249.1   260.2   241.9   18.3    306.6   427.0   211.5   215.5   a
Employment 6.78 8.33 5.32 3.01 a 7.09    7.56    6.79    0.78    7.02    9.07    5.40    3.67    a
ln(Assets) 11.06 11.37 10.76 0.609 a 10.80 10.99 10.68 0.308 a 11.04 11.55 10.64 0.903 a
ROA 0.709 0.590 0.821 -0.231 a 0.882 0.762 0.959 -0.197 a 0.607 0.506 0.687 -0.181 a
Liabilities to Assets 0.599 0.709 0.496 0.212 a 0.759 1.060 0.565 0.494 a 0.845 1.130 0.619 0.511 a
Cash to Assets 0.197 0.151 0.239 -0.088 a 0.246 0.196 0.277 -0.081 a 0.257 0.174 0.322 -0.148 a
C-Corp 0.279 0.307 0.253 0.054 a 0.188 0.202 0.179 0.023 0.140 0.167 0.118 0.048 a
S-Corp 0.201 0.236 0.168 0.067 a 0.241 0.262 0.227 0.034 b 0.310 0.359 0.271 0.088 a
Partnership 0.080 0.074 0.086 -0.012 0.067 0.075 0.062 0.013 0.084 0.078 0.089 -0.010
Firm Age 14.11 12.51 15.63 -3.12 a 13.19 11.10 14.53 -3.43 a 14.19 13.20 14.98 -1.78 a
Bus Bankruptcy N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.023 0.044 0.009 0.034 a 0.010 0.016 0.004 0.012 a
Bus Delinquencies 0.191 0.289 0.099 0.190 a 0.137 0.244 0.067 0.177 a 0.157 0.248 0.085 0.163 a
D&B Bus Credit Score N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 2.993 3.177 2.875 0.301 a 3.610 3.436 3.749 -0.313 a
Use Bus Credit Card 0.286 0.336 0.240 0.096 a 0.468 0.523 0.433 0.090 a 0.472 0.492 0.456 0.036 b
Use Own Credit Card 0.411 0.459 0.366 0.093 a 0.337 0.376 0.312 0.064 a 0.482 0.559 0.421 0.138 a
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.362 0.481 0.249 0.232 a 0.266 0.370 0.199 0.171 a 0.245 0.360 0.155 0.205 a
Industry
SIC 1 0.143 0.150 0.137 0.012 0.118 0.126 0.113 0.013 0.117 0.140 0.099 0.040 a
SIC 2 0.039 0.042 0.035 0.007 0.037 0.044 0.033 0.012 c 0.031 0.033 0.029 0.004
SIC 3 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.000 0.046 0.056 0.040 0.016 b 0.040 0.049 0.032 0.018 a
SIC 4 0.027 0.034 0.021 0.013 a 0.037 0.048 0.030 0.017 b 0.039 0.043 0.035 0.008
SIC 51 0.082 0.103 0.062 0.041 a 0.068 0.070 0.068 0.002 0.057 0.062 0.052 0.010
SIC 52 0.217 0.217 0.216 0.001 0.193 0.191 0.194 -0.0026 0.187 0.188 0.185 0.003
SIC 6 0.068 0.057 0.079 -0.023 a 0.064 0.060 0.067 -0.0076 0.067 0.053 0.079 -0.026 a
SIC 7 0.215 0.201 0.228 -0.027 b 0.249 0.245 0.252 -0.0071 0.253 0.247 0.257 -0.010
SIC 8 0.168 0.155 0.180 -0.025 b 0.185 0.158 0.202 -0.0446 a 0.210 0.184 0.230 -0.046 a
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Table 1 Panel B: 
Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample and separately for Firms that Need Credit vs. Firms that have No Need for Credit. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Need Credit firms include those that applied for credit or 
did not apply because they feared rejection. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
No No No 
Variable All Need Need Difference All Need Need Difference All Need Need Difference
Market Characteristics
MSA 0.786 0.790 0.783 0.007 0.798 0.789 0.803 -0.014 0.793 0.778 0.806 -0.028 b
HHI High 0.487 0.490 0.483 0.007 0.039 0.034 0.043 -0.008 0.479 0.477 0.481 -0.004
HHI Medium N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.063 0.067 0.061 0.006 0.461 0.463 0.459 0.004
Owner Characteristics
Owner Age 49.30 47.38 51.09 -3.712 a 50.07 47.85 51.50 -3.648 a 51.51 49.58 53.03 -3.441 a
Owner Experience 18.70 17.52 19.81 -2.286 a 18.06 16.23 19.23 -3.000 a 19.61 18.84 20.22 -1.373 a
Owner Graduate Degree 0.202 0.197 0.206 -0.009 0.184 0.170 0.193 -0.023 c 0.208 0.178 0.232 -0.054 a
Owner College Degree 0.260 0.277 0.244 0.033 b 0.300 0.293 0.304 -0.011 0.291 0.270 0.307 -0.036 b
Owner Some College 0.255 0.276 0.236 0.040 a 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.001 0.267 0.300 0.241 0.059 a
Black Owner 0.030 0.044 0.016 0.028 a 0.041 0.066 0.025 0.041 a 0.039 0.051 0.030 0.021 a
Asian Owner 0.036 0.028 0.043 -0.014 b 0.043 0.037 0.047 -0.010 0.044 0.042 0.046 -0.005
Hispanic Owner 0.043 0.053 0.034 0.019 a 0.057 0.069 0.050 0.019 b 0.044 0.048 0.040 0.008
Female Owner 0.209 0.198 0.219 -0.020 0.241 0.239 0.243 -0.004 0.263 0.252 0.271 -0.019
Owner Bankruptcy 0.027 0.044 0.011 0.034 a 0.006 0.012 0.002 0.010 a 0.025 0.038 0.015 0.023 a
Owner Delinquencies 0.137 0.199 0.078 0.122 a 0.126 0.226 0.062 0.164 a 0.121 0.190 0.066 0.124 a
Owner Judgement 0.051 0.072 0.030 0.042 a 0.038 0.060 0.023 0.037 a 0.023 0.042 0.008 0.034 a
Owner Personal Wealth N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.524 0.435 0.581 -0.146 a 0.700 0.637 0.749 -0.112 a
Firm-Creditor Relationships
Primary is Comm Bank 0.821 0.823 0.819 0.004 0.823 0.818 0.826 -0.008 0.801 0.811 0.793 0.018
Primary is Savings Assoc 0.096 0.095 0.096 0.000 0.097 0.082 0.107 -0.025 b 0.128 0.129 0.126 0.003
Primary is Finance Co 0.014 0.022 0.006 0.015 a 0.018 0.030 0.011 0.019 a 0.010 0.016 0.006 0.010 a
Primary is Other 0.041 0.045 0.038 0.008 0.036 0.058 0.021 0.037 a 0.035 0.037 0.034 0.004
Primary Length of Relationship 110.1 94.6 124.8 -30.2 a 95.1 79.3 105.2 -26.0 a 123.8 109.8 134.8 -25.0 a
Primary Distance 13.86 15.45 12.37 3.08 32.48 51.27 20.41 30.86 a 32.91 45.77 22.75 23.02 a
Number of Bank Sources 1.244 1.387 1.110 0.277 a 1.215 1.421 1.082 0.339 a 1.229 1.405 1.090 0.316 a
Number of Non-Bank Sources 0.822 1.065 0.595 0.470 a 0.819 1.114 0.630 0.484 a 1.142 1.526 0.839 0.687 a
1993 1998 2003
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Table 2 Panel A: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Need Credit and separately for Applied Firms versus Discouraged Firms. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Need Credit firms include those that applied for credit or 
did not apply because they feared rejection. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Need Applied Discour Difference Need Applied Discour Difference Need Applied Discour Difference
Observations 2,284 1,652 632 1,313 831 482 1,773 1,456 317
Firm Characteristics:
ln(Assets) 11.372 11.751 10.512 1.240 a 10.991 11.414 10.359 1.054 a 11.546 11.987 10.137 1.850 a
ROA 0.590 0.499 0.796 -0.298 a 0.762 0.730 0.809 -0.079 0.506 0.482 0.580 -0.097
Liabilities to Assets 0.709 0.692 0.746 -0.054 c 1.060 1.021 1.118 -0.097 1.130 1.042 1.412 -0.371 b
Cash to Assets 0.151 0.139 0.179 -0.040 a 0.196 0.191 0.204 -0.013 0.174 0.155 0.235 -0.080 a
C-Corp 0.307 0.324 0.268 0.056 b 0.202 0.198 0.207 -0.009 0.167 0.192 0.084 0.108 a
S-Corp 0.236 0.258 0.184 0.074 a 0.262 0.291 0.218 0.074 a 0.359 0.391 0.257 0.134 a
Partnership 0.074 0.078 0.066 0.012 0.075 0.079 0.070 0.009 0.078 0.080 0.073 0.007
Firm Age 12.505 13.022 11.334 1.688 a 11.104 11.194 10.969 0.225 13.198 14.478 9.109 5.368 a
Bus Bankruptcy 0.044 0.026 0.069 -0.043 a 0.016 0.009 0.039 -0.029 b
Bus Delinquencies 0.289 0.244 0.391 -0.147 a 0.244 0.221 0.279 -0.057 b 0.248 0.212 0.361 -0.149 a
D&B Bus Credit Score 3.177 3.083 3.317 -0.234 a 3.436 3.596 2.922 0.674 a
Use Bus Credit Card 0.336 0.375 0.247 0.129 a 0.523 0.532 0.510 0.021 0.492 0.483 0.519 -0.036
Use Own Credit Card 0.459 0.453 0.473 -0.021 0.376 0.438 0.283 0.154 a 0.559 0.593 0.452 0.141 a
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.481 0.474 0.497 -0.023 0.370 0.378 0.359 0.019 0.360 0.372 0.322 0.050
Industry:
SIC 1 0.150 0.155 0.138 0.017 0.126 0.127 0.124 0.003 0.140 0.148 0.115 0.033
SIC 2 0.042 0.044 0.038 0.006 0.044 0.048 0.038 0.010 0.033 0.037 0.022 0.015
SIC 3 0.041 0.049 0.022 0.027 a 0.056 0.054 0.060 -0.006 0.049 0.057 0.026 0.030 b
SIC 4 0.034 0.033 0.038 -0.005 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.000 0.043 0.048 0.030 0.017
SIC 51 0.103 0.101 0.107 -0.006 0.070 0.073 0.066 0.007 0.062 0.066 0.048 0.018
SIC 52 0.217 0.224 0.200 0.024 0.191 0.184 0.202 -0.018 0.188 0.186 0.193 -0.007
SIC 6 0.057 0.059 0.052 0.006 0.060 0.069 0.045 0.024 c 0.053 0.059 0.034 0.025 c
SIC 7 0.201 0.171 0.269 -0.098 a 0.245 0.246 0.244 0.001 0.247 0.215 0.350 -0.135 a
SIC 8 0.155 0.164 0.136 0.028 c 0.158 0.150 0.169 -0.020 0.184 0.185 0.182 0.003
200319981993
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Table 2 Panel B: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Need Credit and separately for Applied Firms versus Discouraged Firms. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Need Credit firms include those that applied for credit or 
did not apply because they feared rejection. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Need Applied Discour Difference Need Applied Discour Difference Need Applied Discour Difference
Market Characteristics:
MSA 0.790 0.748 0.886 -0.138 a 0.789 0.761 0.831 -0.070 a 0.778 0.756 0.846 -0.090 a
HHI High 0.490 0.525 0.413 0.111 a 0.034 0.043 0.021 0.022 b 0.477 0.467 0.509 -0.043
HHI Medium 0.067 0.075 0.055 0.020 0.463 0.472 0.433 0.039
Owner Characteristics:
Owner Age 47.382 47.467 47.188 0.280 47.851 47.131 48.928 -1.797 a 49.584 50.406 46.959 3.447 a
Owner Experience 17.524 18.010 16.422 1.588 a 16.231 16.305 16.121 0.184 18.844 19.981 15.209 4.773 a
Owner Graduate Degree 0.197 0.200 0.191 0.008 0.170 0.177 0.159 0.018 0.178 0.190 0.140 0.050 b
Owner College Degree 0.277 0.286 0.257 0.030 0.293 0.307 0.273 0.034 0.270 0.279 0.241 0.038
Owner Some College 0.276 0.286 0.254 0.032 0.279 0.264 0.302 -0.038 0.300 0.282 0.360 -0.078 b
Black Owner 0.044 0.031 0.074 -0.042 a 0.066 0.045 0.096 -0.051 a 0.051 0.037 0.095 -0.058 a
Asian Owner 0.028 0.024 0.038 -0.014 0.037 0.043 0.028 0.015 0.042 0.040 0.046 -0.006
Hispanic Owner 0.053 0.038 0.086 -0.048 a 0.069 0.063 0.079 -0.016 0.048 0.044 0.062 -0.019
Female Owner 0.198 0.184 0.230 -0.046 b 0.239 0.208 0.286 -0.078 a 0.252 0.209 0.389 -0.180 a
Owner Bankruptcy 0.044 0.024 0.091 -0.067 a 0.012 0.007 0.019 -0.012 0.038 0.014 0.113 -0.099 a
Owner Delinquencies 0.199 0.145 0.323 -0.178 a 0.226 0.179 0.295 -0.116 a 0.190 0.122 0.408 -0.287 a
Owner Judgement 0.072 0.048 0.127 -0.079 a 0.060 0.058 0.064 -0.007 0.042 0.036 0.061 -0.025
Owner Personal Wealth 0.435 0.543 0.272 0.271 a 0.637 0.759 0.247 0.512 a
Firm-Creditor Relationship Characteristics:
Primary is Comm Bank 0.823 0.853 0.754 0.099 a 0.818 0.833 0.796 0.037 0.811 0.824 0.771 0.053 c
Primary is Savings Assoc 0.095 0.084 0.121 -0.037 b 0.082 0.075 0.093 -0.018 0.129 0.118 0.166 -0.048 c
Primary is Finance Co 0.022 0.020 0.025 -0.005 0.030 0.033 0.026 0.006 0.016 0.018 0.009 0.008
Primary is Other 0.045 0.042 0.053 -0.011 0.058 0.060 0.055 0.005 0.037 0.040 0.028 0.013
Primary Length of Relationship 94.56 99.06 84.36 14.70 a 79.25 80.12 77.96 2.16 109.85 120.69 75.21 45.48 a
Primary Distance 15.45 17.38 11.06 6.32 c 51.27 63.36 33.17 30.19 b 45.77 43.18 54.03 -10.85
Number of Bank Sources 1.387 1.521 1.085 0.436 a 1.421 1.614 1.133 0.481 a 1.405 1.501 1.101 0.400 a
Number of Non-Bank Sources 1.065 1.155 0.860 0.295 a 1.114 1.357 0.750 0.607 a 1.526 1.631 1.190 0.441 a
1993 1998 2003
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Table 3 Panel A: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Need Credit and separately for Denied Firms versus Discouraged Firms. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Need Credit firms include those that applied for credit or 
did not apply because they feared rejection. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Need Denied Discour Difference Need Denied Discour Difference Need Denied Discour Difference
Observations 935 303 632 667 185 482 471 154 317
Firm Characteristics:
ln(Assets) 10.710 11.163 10.512 0.651 a 10.489 10.850 10.359 0.491 a 10.499 11.368 10.137 1.231 a
ROA 0.680 0.415 0.796 -0.382 a 0.751 0.590 0.809 -0.219 c 0.551 0.483 0.580 -0.097
Liabilities to Assets 0.757 0.781 0.746 0.035 1.150 1.238 1.118 0.120 1.498 1.704 1.412 0.291
Cash to Assets 0.165 0.135 0.179 -0.044 a 0.199 0.186 0.204 -0.018 0.205 0.132 0.235 -0.103 a
C-Corp 0.271 0.279 0.268 0.011 0.185 0.123 0.207 -0.084 a 0.101 0.140 0.084 0.056
S-Corp 0.213 0.281 0.184 0.097 a 0.235 0.283 0.218 0.066 c 0.298 0.397 0.257 0.140 a
Partnership 0.059 0.042 0.066 -0.024 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.001 0.075 0.079 0.073 0.006
Firm Age 10.980 10.173 11.334 -1.162 c 10.424 8.909 10.969 -2.060 a 9.799 11.459 9.109 2.350 b
Bus Bankruptcy N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.076 0.095 0.069 0.025 0.037 0.034 0.039 -0.005
Bus Delinquencies 0.398 0.413 0.391 0.022 0.321 0.438 0.279 0.159 a 0.355 0.342 0.361 -0.019
D&B Bus Credit Score N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 3.326 3.351 3.317 0.034 2.850 2.678 2.922 -0.244 c
Use Bus Credit Card 0.268 0.315 0.247 0.068 b 0.530 0.585 0.510 0.075 c 0.533 0.568 0.519 0.049
Use Own Credit Card 0.478 0.488 0.473 0.015 0.294 0.323 0.283 0.040 0.480 0.547 0.452 0.095 c
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.505 0.524 0.497 0.027 0.389 0.474 0.359 0.115 a 0.358 0.442 0.322 0.120 b
Industry:
SIC 1 0.145 0.163 0.138 0.026 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.000 0.114 0.112 0.115 -0.002
SIC 2 0.039 0.040 0.038 0.002 0.043 0.054 0.038 0.016 0.025 0.033 0.022 0.012
SIC 3 0.033 0.058 0.022 0.036 b 0.061 0.063 0.060 0.004 0.042 0.080 0.026 0.053 b
SIC 4 0.039 0.042 0.038 0.004 0.045 0.038 0.048 -0.010 0.045 0.079 0.030 0.049 c
SIC 51 0.106 0.104 0.107 -0.004 0.057 0.031 0.066 -0.034 c 0.045 0.036 0.048 -0.012
SIC 52 0.215 0.249 0.200 0.049 0.193 0.168 0.202 -0.034 0.198 0.208 0.193 0.014
SIC 6 0.047 0.034 0.052 -0.018 0.045 0.045 0.045 -0.001 0.036 0.041 0.034 0.007
SIC 7 0.246 0.193 0.269 -0.076 b 0.268 0.334 0.244 0.090 b 0.315 0.230 0.350 -0.120 b
SIC 8 0.130 0.116 0.136 -0.020 0.162 0.142 0.169 -0.027 0.181 0.180 0.182 -0.002
1993 1998 2003
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Table 3 Panel B: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Need Credit and separately for Denied Firms versus Discouraged Firms. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Need Credit firms include those that applied for credit or 
did not apply because they feared rejection. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Need Denied Discour Difference Need Denied Discour Difference Need Denied Discour Difference
Market Characteristics:
MSA 0.873 0.844 0.886 -0.042 c 0.824 0.804 0.831 -0.027 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.000
HHI High 0.436 0.487 0.413 0.074 b 0.027 0.045 0.021 0.024 0.504 0.491 0.509 -0.019
HHI Medium 0.059 0.071 0.055 0.017 0.442 0.463 0.433 0.029
Owner Characteristics:
Owner Age 46.800 45.916 47.188 -1.272 c 47.883 44.976 48.928 -3.952 a 47.117 47.499 46.959 0.540
Owner Experience 16.375 16.268 16.422 -0.154 15.580 14.075 16.121 -2.046 a 15.685 16.832 15.209 1.623
Owner Graduate Degree 0.188 0.181 0.191 -0.010 0.158 0.154 0.159 -0.005 0.129 0.104 0.140 -0.036
Owner College Degree 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.001 0.271 0.264 0.273 -0.009 0.248 0.266 0.241 0.024
Owner Some College 0.280 0.340 0.254 0.087 a 0.301 0.297 0.302 -0.005 0.358 0.355 0.360 -0.005
Black Owner 0.075 0.078 0.074 0.004 0.099 0.108 0.096 0.012 0.123 0.190 0.095 0.094 b
Asian Owner 0.038 0.037 0.038 -0.001 0.038 0.066 0.028 0.038 c 0.043 0.036 0.046 -0.010
Hispanic Owner 0.071 0.037 0.086 -0.050 a 0.091 0.124 0.079 0.045 0.060 0.055 0.062 -0.007
Female Owner 0.232 0.237 0.230 0.007 0.270 0.224 0.286 -0.062 0.345 0.238 0.389 -0.151 a
Owner Bankruptcy 0.081 0.059 0.091 -0.031 c 0.022 0.031 0.019 0.012 0.095 0.053 0.113 -0.060 b
Owner Delinquencies 0.319 0.311 0.323 -0.012 0.319 0.383 0.295 0.088 b 0.385 0.329 0.408 -0.080
Owner Judgement 0.123 0.114 0.127 -0.014 0.088 0.153 0.064 0.089 a 0.065 0.073 0.061 0.012
Owner Personal Wealth 0.283 0.313 0.272 0.041 0.300 0.427 0.247 0.180 a
Relationship Characteristics:
Primary is Comm Bank 0.772 0.812 0.754 0.057 b 0.792 0.784 0.796 -0.012 0.773 0.778 0.771 0.007
Primary is Savings Assoc 0.103 0.061 0.121 -0.061 a 0.094 0.098 0.093 0.006 0.158 0.140 0.166 -0.026
Primary is Finance Co 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.000 0.031 0.044 0.026 0.017 0.017 0.036 0.009 0.027
Primary is Other 0.068 0.102 0.053 0.049 b 0.060 0.074 0.055 0.019 0.033 0.046 0.028 0.018
Primary Length of Relationship 81.853 76.150 84.358 -8.207 74.707 65.661 77.958 -12.296 b 79.943 91.317 75.212 16.105 c
Primary Distance 17.870 33.364 11.064 22.300 b 36.575 46.042 33.172 12.869 55.728 59.805 54.032 5.772
Number of Bank Sources 1.207 1.486 1.085 0.401 a 1.260 1.614 1.133 0.481 a 1.247 1.599 1.101 0.498 a
Number of Non-Bank Sources 1.032 1.423 0.860 0.562 a 0.886 1.266 0.750 0.517 a 1.451 2.080 1.190 0.889 a
1993 1998 2003
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Table 4 Panel A: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Applied for Credit and separately for Denied Firms versus Approved Firms. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Applied firms include firms that applied for credit and 
whose applications were denied or approved. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Applied Denied Approved Difference Applied Denied Approved Difference Applied Denied Approved Difference
Observations 1,652 303 1,349 831 185 646 1,456 154 1,302
Firm Characteristics:
ln(Assets) 11.751 11.163 11.893 -0.730 a 11.414 10.850 11.592 -0.742 a 11.987 11.368 12.080 -0.712 a
ROA 0.499 0.415 0.519 -0.104 0.730 0.590 0.774 -0.184 c 0.482 0.483 0.482 0.001
Liabilities to Assets 0.692 0.781 0.670 0.111 a 1.021 1.238 0.952 0.286 b 1.042 1.704 0.943 0.761 a
Cash to Assets 0.139 0.135 0.140 -0.005 0.191 0.186 0.193 -0.007 0.155 0.132 0.159 -0.026
C-Corp 0.324 0.279 0.335 -0.056 c 0.198 0.123 0.222 -0.099 a 0.192 0.140 0.200 -0.060 c
S-Corp 0.258 0.281 0.253 0.028 0.291 0.283 0.294 -0.011 0.391 0.397 0.390 0.006
Partnership 0.078 0.042 0.086 -0.044 a 0.079 0.071 0.081 -0.010 0.080 0.079 0.080 -0.001
Firm Age 13.022 10.173 13.707 -3.535 a 11.194 8.909 11.916 -3.008 a 14.478 11.459 14.929 -3.471 a
Bus Bankruptcy N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.026 0.095 0.005 0.090 a 0.009 0.034 0.006 0.028 c
Bus Delinquencies 0.244 0.413 0.203 0.210 a 0.221 0.438 0.153 0.285 a 0.212 0.342 0.193 0.149 a
D&B Bus Credit Score N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 3.083 3.351 2.999 0.352 a 3.596 2.678 3.734 -1.056 a
Use Bus Credit Card 0.375 0.315 0.390 -0.075 b 0.532 0.585 0.515 0.071 c 0.483 0.568 0.471 0.097 b
Use Own Credit Card 0.453 0.488 0.444 0.044 0.438 0.323 0.474 -0.151 a 0.593 0.547 0.600 -0.053
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.474 0.524 0.462 0.062 c 0.378 0.474 0.347 0.127 a 0.372 0.442 0.361 0.081 c
Industry:
SIC 1 0.155 0.163 0.153 0.011 0.127 0.124 0.128 -0.004 0.148 0.112 0.153 -0.041
SIC 2 0.044 0.040 0.045 -0.005 0.048 0.054 0.047 0.008 0.037 0.033 0.037 -0.004
SIC 3 0.049 0.058 0.047 0.011 0.054 0.063 0.051 0.013 0.057 0.080 0.053 0.026
SIC 4 0.033 0.042 0.030 0.012 0.048 0.038 0.051 -0.013 0.048 0.079 0.043 0.037
SIC 51 0.101 0.104 0.101 0.003 0.073 0.031 0.086 -0.054 a 0.066 0.036 0.071 -0.035 c
SIC 52 0.224 0.249 0.218 0.031 0.184 0.168 0.189 -0.020 0.186 0.208 0.183 0.024
SIC 6 0.059 0.034 0.064 -0.030 b 0.069 0.045 0.077 -0.033 c 0.059 0.041 0.062 -0.020
SIC 7 0.171 0.193 0.166 0.027 0.246 0.334 0.217 0.117 a 0.215 0.230 0.213 0.017
SIC 8 0.164 0.116 0.176 -0.060 a 0.150 0.142 0.152 -0.010 0.185 0.180 0.185 -0.005
1993 1998 2003
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Table 4 Panel B: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Applied for Credit and separately for Denied Firms versus Approved Firms. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Applied firms include firms that applied for credit and 
whose applications were denied or approved. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Applied Denied Approved Difference Applied Denied Approved Difference Applied Denied Approved Difference
Market Characteristics:
MSA 0.748 0.844 0.725 0.119 a 0.761 0.804 0.747 0.057 0.756 0.846 0.743 0.103 a
HHI High 0.525 0.487 0.534 -0.047 0.043 0.045 0.043 0.002 0.467 0.491 0.463 0.028
HHI Medium N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.075 0.071 0.076 -0.005 0.472 0.463 0.473 -0.011
Owner Characteristics:
Owner Age 47.47 45.92 47.84 -1.925 a 47.13 44.98 47.81 -2.837 a 50.41 47.50 50.84 -3.343 a
Owner Experience 18.01 16.27 18.43 -2.161 a 16.30 14.08 17.01 -2.934 a 19.98 16.83 20.45 -3.621 a
Owner Graduate Degree 0.200 0.181 0.204 -0.023 0.177 0.154 0.184 -0.030 0.190 0.104 0.203 -0.099 a
Owner College Degree 0.286 0.257 0.293 -0.035 0.307 0.264 0.320 -0.056 0.279 0.266 0.281 -0.016
Owner Some College 0.286 0.340 0.273 0.067 b 0.264 0.297 0.254 0.043 0.282 0.355 0.271 0.084 c
Black Owner 0.031 0.078 0.020 0.058 a 0.045 0.108 0.026 0.082 a 0.037 0.190 0.014 0.175 a
Asian Owner 0.024 0.037 0.021 0.017 0.043 0.066 0.035 0.031 0.040 0.036 0.041 -0.005
Hispanic Owner 0.038 0.037 0.039 -0.002 0.063 0.124 0.043 0.080 a 0.044 0.055 0.042 0.013
Female Owner 0.184 0.237 0.171 0.066 b 0.208 0.224 0.203 0.022 0.209 0.238 0.205 0.033
Owner Bankruptcy 0.024 0.059 0.015 0.044 a 0.007 0.031 0.000 0.031 b 0.014 0.053 0.009 0.044 b
Owner Delinquencies 0.145 0.311 0.105 0.207 a 0.179 0.383 0.115 0.268 a 0.122 0.329 0.091 0.238 a
Owner Judgement 0.048 0.114 0.032 0.081 a 0.058 0.153 0.028 0.126 a 0.036 0.073 0.030 0.043 c
Owner Personal Wealth N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.543 0.313 0.616 -0.304 a 0.759 0.427 0.809 -0.382 a
1993 1998 2003
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Table 4 Panel C: 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms that Applied for Credit and separately for Denied Firms versus Approved Firms. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Applied firms include firms that applied for credit and 
whose applications were denied or approved. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Applied Denied Approved Difference Applied Denied Approved Difference Applied Denied Approved Diffe
Relationship Characteristics:
MRL Source is a Comm Banks 0.806 0.812 0.804 0.008 0.686 0.740 0.669 0.071 c 0.747 0.845 0.732 0.
MRL Source Savings Assoc 0.068 0.058 0.071 -0.013 0.077 0.054 0.084 -0.031 0.113 0.083 0.117 -0.
MRL Source Finance Co 0.047 0.034 0.050 -0.017 0.111 0.050 0.130 -0.080 a 0.084 0.046 0.090 -0.
MRL Source Other 0.079 0.096 0.075 0.022 0.115 0.138 0.108 0.030 0.056 0.027 0.061 -0.
MRL Length of Relationship 87.48 66.33 92.58 -26.24 a 57.17 38.06 63.15 -25.09 a 103.00 67.72 108.28 -40.
MRL Distance from Firm 50.04 67.61 45.85 21.76 125.12 77.18 140.13 -62.96 a 66.25 27.50 72.05 -44.
Number of Bank Sources 1.521 1.486 1.529 -0.043 1.614 1.614 1.614 0.000 1.501 1.599 1.486 0.
Number of Non-Bank Sources 1.155 1.423 1.091 0.332 a 1.357 1.266 1.386 -0.119 1.631 2.080 1.564 0.
MRL Checking Relationship 0.678 0.624 0.690 -0.066 b 0.479 0.479 0.479 0.000 0.666 0.581 0.678 -0.
MRL Savings Relationship 0.181 0.079 0.205 -0.127 a 0.117 0.100 0.122 -0.022 0.137 0.082 0.145 -0.
MRL Fin'l Svcs Relationship 0.256 0.193 0.272 -0.078 a 0.266 0.222 0.280 -0.058 0.436 0.391 0.442 -0.
MRL Line of Credit Relationship 0.049 0.041 0.051 -0.010 0.114 0.075 0.126 -0.050 b 0.111 0.119 0.110 0.
MRL Loan Relationship 0.209 0.183 0.216 -0.033 0.161 0.056 0.194 -0.138 a 0.222 0.133 0.235 -0.
MRL is a Credit Line 0.495 0.411 0.516 -0.105 a 0.373 0.578 0.308 0.270 a 0.367 0.074 0.411 -0.
MRL is a New Credit Line N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.205 0.463 0.166 0.
MRL is a Lease 0.025 0.022 0.026 -0.003 0.055 0.067 0.051 0.016 0.014 0.009 0.015 -0.
MRL is a Mortgage 0.112 0.108 0.113 -0.005 0.109 0.059 0.125 -0.066 a 0.106 0.101 0.106 -0.
MRL is a Motor Vehicle Loan 0.089 0.048 0.099 -0.051 a 0.155 0.028 0.194 -0.166 a 0.114 0.086 0.118 -0.
MRL is an Equipment Loan 0.105 0.115 0.103 0.012 0.133 0.067 0.154 -0.088 a 0.102 0.144 0.096 0.
MRL is an Other Loan 0.173 0.296 0.144 0.152 a 0.175 0.201 0.167 0.034 0.093 0.123 0.088 0.
1993 1998 2003
rence
113 a
035
044 b
034 b
56 a
55 a
112
516 a
097 b
063 b
052
009
102 a
337 a
297 a
006
006
032
048
035
 
 
Table 5 Panel A: 
Who Needs Credit? 
The dependent variable Need Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 0 if the firm 
indicated that it needed credit (applied for credit and was extended or denied credit or was 
discouraged and did not apply for credit) and a value of 1 if the firm did not apply for credit 
because it did not need credit. The model is estimated using a weighted probit model. Data are 
from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Explanatory variables are 
defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Marginal Marginal Marginal
Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Intercept  4.83 a  1.94 c  3.25 a
Firm Characteristics
ln(Assets) -0.022 -4.38 a 0.004 0.73 -0.028 -5.25 a
ROA 0.000 -0.09 0.016 2.56 b 0.009 1.01
Liabilities to Assets -0.103 -7.69 a -0.040 -5.54 a -0.026 -6.28 a
Cash to Assets 0.202 6.10 a 0.095 3.07 a 0.153 5.33 a
C-Corp -0.013 -0.72 -0.009 -0.38 -0.042 -1.74 c
S-Corp -0.037 -1.91 c 0.000 -0.01 -0.033 -1.86 c
Partnership 0.014 0.51 -0.062 -2.00 b 0.004 0.15
Firm Age 0.003 2.80 a 0.004 3.67 a 0.001 1.13
Bus Bankruptcy -0.224 -3.86 a -0.210 -2.21 b
Bus Delinquencies -0.107 -5.13 a -0.091 -3.40 a -0.033 -1.37
D&B Bus Credit Score -0.028 -3.44 a 0.013 2.42 b
Use Bus Credit Card -0.028 -1.83 c -0.036 -2.25 b -0.033 -2.18 b
Use Own Credit Card -0.042 -2.97 a -0.025 -1.45 -0.055 -3.55 a
Trade Credit Paid Late -0.091 -5.98 a -0.048 -2.56 b -0.097 -5.25 a
SIC 2 0.034 0.85 -0.044 -0.97 0.056 1.18
SIC 3 0.064 1.69 c -0.060 -1.45 0.001 0.03
SIC 4 -0.055 -1.21 -0.021 -0.46 0.079 1.87 c
SIC 51 -0.075 -2.49 b 0.015 0.42 0.050 1.35
SIC 52 0.024 1.05 0.036 1.28 0.096 3.50 a
SIC 6 0.060 1.84 c 0.005 0.13 0.075 2.08 b
SIC 7 0.009 0.40 0.035 1.29 0.057 2.19 b
SIC 8 0.034 1.21 0.042 1.32 0.042 1.44
1993 1998 2003
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Table 5 Panel B: 
Who Needs Credit? 
The dependent variable Need Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 0 if the firm 
indicated that it needed credit (applied for credit and was extended or denied credit or was 
discouraged and did not apply for credit) and a value of 1 if the firm did not apply for credit 
because it did not need credit. The model is estimated using a weighted probit model. Data are 
from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Explanatory variables are 
defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variable Marginal Marginal Marginal
Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Market Characteristics
MSA 0.020 1.12 0.044 2.07 b 0.050 2.57 b
HHI High -0.018 -1.27 0.054 1.24 0.021 0.64
HHI Medium -0.002 -0.07 0.015 0.48
Owner Characteristics
Owner Age 0.003 3.77 a 0.001 1.26 0.003 3.85 a
Owner Experience -0.001 -0.66 0.001 0.65 -0.001 -1.02
Owner Graduate Degree -0.043 -1.86 c 0.074 2.67 a 0.043 1.71 c
Owner College Degree -0.034 -1.78 c 0.054 2.44 b 0.034 1.59
Owner Some College -0.046 -2.47 b 0.052 2.43 b -0.015 -0.72
Black Owner -0.187 -4.26 a -0.171 -4.39 a -0.112 -2.93 a
Asian Owner 0.086 2.30 b 0.033 0.86 0.016 0.46
Hispanic Owner -0.104 -3.13 a -0.057 -1.76 c 0.000 -0.01
Female Owner 0.029 1.71 c 0.007 0.37 -0.033 -1.86 c
Owner Bankruptcy -0.273 -5.51 a -0.148 -1.14 -0.154 -2.95 a
Owner Delinquencies -0.075 -3.19 a -0.166 -6.33 a -0.136 -5.34 a
Owner Judgement -0.109 -3.19 a -0.080 -1.87 c -0.200 -3.34 a
Owner Personal Wealth 0.018 2.00 b 0.034 3.71 a
Firm-Creditor Relationship Characteristics
Primary is Savings Assoc -0.040 -1.56 -0.023 -0.78 -0.021 -0.81
Primary is Finance Co -0.183 -2.79 a -0.125 -2.04 b -0.030 -0.36
Primary is Other 0.079 2.22 b -0.139 -2.99 a 0.048 1.14
Primary Length of Relationship 0.000 0.76 0.000 2.69 a 0.000 2.16 b
Primary Distance 0.000 0.92 0.000 -0.25 0.000 -2.29 b
Number of Bank Sources -0.079 -7.50 a -0.114 -9.42 a -0.082 -7.32 a
Number of Non-Bank Sources -0.047 -6.11 a -0.068 -7.87 a -0.072 -9.72 a
1993 1998 2003
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Table 6 Panel A: 
Who Applies for Credit?  
The dependent variable Applied for Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 0 if the 
firm applied for credit and was extended or denied credit and a value of 1 if the firm was 
discouraged and did not apply for credit. These results are obtained as the second stage of a 
bivariate probit selection model where Need Credit is the selection equation. Need Credit takes 
on a value of one if the firm was approved, denied or discouraged and a value of zero if the firm 
did not apply for credit because it did not need credit. Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 
Surveys of Small Business Finance. Explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Intercept  4.55 a  1.81 c  5.98 a
Firm Characteristics
ln(Assets) -0.052 -8.69 a -0.036 -4.03 a -0.039 -7.84 a
ROA -0.003 -0.55 -0.005 -0.52 -0.015 -2.04 b
Liabilities to Assets -0.007 -0.60 0.001 0.11 -0.005 -1.83 c
Cash to Assets 0.007 0.17 -0.101 -1.99 b -0.001 -0.03
C-Corp 0.023 1.11 0.105 3.10 a -0.032 -1.42
S-Corp -0.026 -1.18 0.016 0.53 -0.054 -3.52 a
Partnership -0.018 -0.57 -0.039 -0.84 -0.028 -1.06
Firm Age 0.000 -0.11 0.001 0.70 -0.004 -3.77 a
Bus Bankruptcy 0.133 2.28 b 0.057 1.20
Bus Delinquencies 0.079 4.02 a 0.076 2.21 b 0.081 4.69 a
D&B Credit Score 0.021 1.76 c -0.009 -1.72 c
Use Bus Credit Card -0.030 -1.69 c 0.003 0.14 0.018 1.37
Use Own Credit Card 0.021 1.32 -0.070 -2.77 a -0.007 -0.56
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.011 0.64 0.009 0.34 -0.025 -1.66 c
Industry
SIC 2 0.018 0.43 0.012 0.19 -0.013 -0.30
SIC 3 -0.100 -1.95 c -0.004 -0.08 -0.037 -0.99
SIC 4 0.051 1.12 0.089 1.45 0.024 0.68
SIC 51 0.065 2.09 b 0.057 1.08 0.060 1.81 c
SIC 52 0.049 1.88 c 0.025 0.62 0.009 0.38
SIC 6 0.086 2.18 b -0.024 -0.40 0.008 0.22
SIC 7 0.061 2.31 b -0.017 -0.43 0.042 1.93 c
SIC 8 -0.020 -0.63 0.040 0.868 0.003 0.10
1993 1998 2003
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Table 6 Panel B: 
Who Applies for Credit?  
The dependent variable Applied for Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 0 if the 
firm applied for credit and was extended or denied credit and a value of 1 if the firm was 
discouraged and did not apply for credit. These results are obtained as the second stage of a 
bivariate probit selection model where Need Credit is the selection equation. Need Credit takes 
on a value of one if the firm was approved, denied or discouraged and a value of zero if the firm 
did not apply for credit because it did not need credit. Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 
Surveys of Small Business Finance. Explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Market Characteristics
MSA 0.129 5.65 a 0.073 2.26 b 0.082 4.46 a
HHI High -0.043 -2.62 a -0.064 -0.89 0.003 0.10
HHI Medium -0.057 -1.11 -0.014 -0.53
Owner Characteristics
Owner Age 0.002 2.06 b 0.004 2.85 a -0.001 -0.78
Owner Experience 0.000 -0.12 0.001 0.44 0.003 3.28 a
Owner Graduate Degree 0.005 0.19 -0.016 -0.40 -0.013 -0.59
Owner College Degree -0.021 -0.95 0.018 0.54 -0.007 -0.39
Owner Some College -0.047 -2.21 b 0.036 1.18 -0.005 -0.30
Black Owner 0.047 1.32 0.088 1.90 c -0.033 -1.25
Asian Owner 0.092 2.13 b -0.026 -0.42 0.030 0.93
Hispanic Owner 0.079 2.42 b -0.001 -0.03 -0.030 -1.09
Female Owner 0.006 0.32 0.033 1.22 0.018 1.27
Owner Bankruptcy 0.171 4.80 a 0.031 0.30 0.095 2.93 a
Owner Delinquencies 0.069 3.24 a 0.040 1.30 0.094 5.71 a
Owner Judgement 0.114 3.90 a -0.088 -1.80 c -0.036 -1.17
Owner Personal Wealth -0.046 -2.40 b -0.049 -3.18 a
Firm-Creditor Relationship Characteristics
Primary is Savings Assoc -0.009 -0.31 0.010 0.21 -0.028 -1.29
Primary is Finance Co 0.094 1.71 c 0.096 1.31 0.015 0.26
Primary is Other 0.010 0.26 0.082 1.49 -0.042 -1.12
Primary Length of Relationship 0.000 -1.55 0.000 -0.54 0.000 -4.64 a
Primary Distance 0.000 -1.53 0.000 -1.83 c 0.000 0.19
Number of Bank Sources -0.102 -7.94 a -0.134 -7.26 a -0.040 -3.99 a
Number of Non-Bank Sources -0.030 -3.85 a -0.087 -7.08 a -0.016 -2.74 a
1993 1998 2003
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Table 7 Panel A: 
Who is Denied Credit and Who is Discouraged from Applying Credit?  
The dependent variable Denied Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 0 if the firm 
applied for credit and was denied credit and a value of 1 if the firm was discouraged and did not 
apply for credit. These results are obtained as the second stage of a bivariate probit selection 
model where Need Credit is the selection equation. Need Credit takes on a value of 1 if the firm 
was denied or discouraged  and a value of 0 if the firm did not apply for credit because it did not 
need credit. Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. 
Explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal  Marginal  
Variable Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Intercept  1.32  1.25  3.65 a
Firm Characteristics
ln(Assets) -0.018 -1.73 c -0.006 -0.47 -0.039 -2.82 a
ROA 0.022 1.89 c 0.029 2.24 b -0.021 -1.00
Liabilities to Assets 0.004 0.20 0.007 0.54 -0.013 -1.87 c
Cash to Assets 0.109 1.46 -0.066 -0.95 0.105 1.39
C-Corp 0.022 0.58 0.121 2.38 b -0.073 -1.20
S-Corp -0.051 -1.34 0.024 0.60 -0.114 -2.79 a
Partnership 0.061 0.93 -0.023 -0.36 -0.053 -0.76
Firm Age 0.004 1.67 c 0.004 1.73 c -0.003 -1.13
Bus Bankruptcy -0.050 -0.81 0.062 0.61
Bus Delinquencies 0.020 0.59 -0.002 -0.04 0.116 2.66 a
D&B Bus Credit Score 0.006 0.37 0.023 1.78 c
Use Bus Credit Card -0.015 -0.45 -0.047 -1.44 -0.001 -0.02
Use Own Credit Card 0.012 0.41 -0.020 -0.56 -0.018 -0.52
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.048 1.56 -0.036 -0.97 -0.075 -1.89 c
SIC 2 0.117 1.52 -0.070 -0.80 0.050 0.47
SIC 3 -0.101 -1.27 -0.057 -0.78 -0.148 -1.72 c
SIC 4 0.105 1.30 0.091 0.98 -0.039 -0.46
SIC 51 0.113 2.03 b 0.125 1.41 0.146 1.58
SIC 52 0.084 1.81 c 0.020 0.35 0.032 0.54
SIC 6 0.236 2.96 a -0.032 -0.36 -0.016 -0.15
SIC 7 0.132 2.83 a -0.056 -1.10 0.164 2.62 a
SIC 8 0.111 1.95 c 0.017 0.27 0.020 0.28
1993 1998 2003
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Table 7 Panel B: 
Who is Denied Credit and Who is Discouraged from Applying Credit?  
The dependent variable Denied Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 0 if the firm 
applied for credit and was denied credit and a value of 1 if the firm was discouraged and did not 
apply for credit. These results are obtained as the second stage of a bivariate probit selection 
model where Need Credit is the selection equation. Need Credit takes on a value of 1 if the firm 
was denied or discouraged  and a value of 0 if the firm did not apply for credit because it did not 
need credit. Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. 
Explanatory variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal  Marginal  
Variable Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Market Characteristics
MSA 0.036 0.86 -0.006 -0.13 0.063 1.27
HHI High -0.046 -1.54 -0.107 -1.14 -0.083 -1.02
HHI Medium -0.098 -1.31 -0.052 -0.65
Owner Characteristics
Owner Age 0.004 2.28 b 0.006 3.20 a 0.000 0.19
Owner Experience -0.003 -1.39 0.000 -0.17 0.004 1.66 c
Owner Graduate Degree 0.009 0.20 0.041 0.72 0.015 0.23
Owner College Degree 0.006 0.14 0.006 0.14 -0.042 -0.83
Owner Some College -0.036 -0.94 0.023 0.56 -0.025 -0.57
Black Owner -0.022 -0.42 -0.061 -1.18 -0.270 -4.90 a
Asian Owner 0.026 0.36 -0.139 -1.99 b -0.056 -0.61
Hispanic Owner 0.100 1.53 -0.130 -2.60 a -0.042 -0.55
Female Owner -0.005 -0.14 0.027 0.73 0.058 1.45
Owner Bankruptcy 0.078 1.41 -0.056 -0.54 0.032 0.42
Owner Delinquencies -0.024 -0.67 -0.062 -1.61 0.057 1.41
Owner Judgement 0.065 1.40 -0.125 -2.41 b -0.070 -0.99
Owner Personal Wealth -0.037 -1.39 -0.017 -0.45
Firm-Creditor Relationship Characteristics
Primary is Savings Assoc 0.087 1.50 -0.084 -1.36 -0.007 -0.12
Primary is Finance Co 0.088 0.93 -0.024 -0.25 -0.099 -0.77
Primary is Other -0.050 -0.90 0.040 0.59 -0.006 -0.06
Primary Length of Relationship 0.000 -0.62 0.000 0.65 -0.001 -2.95 a
Primary Distance 0.000 -2.00 b 0.000 -0.35 0.000 -0.07
Number of Bank Sources -0.100 -4.75 a -0.152 -6.18 a -0.071 -3.05 a
Number of Non-Bank Sources -0.055 -4.43 a -0.071 -4.24 a -0.061 -4.44 a
1993 1998 2003
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Table 8 Panel A: 
Who Gets Credit?  
The dependent variable Get Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm 
applied for and was extended credit and a value of 0 if the firm applied for and was denied credit. 
These results are obtained as the second stage of a bivariate probit selection model where 
Applied for Credit is the selection equation. Applied for Credit takes on a value of 1 if the firm 
applied for credit and a value of 0 if the firm did not apply for credit because it was discouraged. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Intercept  -2.23 b 831.000 -1.31  -1.84 c
Firm Characteristics
ln(Assets) 0.035 5.17 a 0.007 0.67 0.023 3.81 a
ROA 0.020 2.59 a 0.029 2.76 a -0.002 -0.24
Liabilities to Assets 0.001 0.08 -0.008 -0.72 -0.004 -1.21
Cash to Assets 0.033 0.68 0.039 0.72 0.087 2.88 a
C-Corp 0.005 0.23 0.038 1.00 -0.008 -0.34
S-Corp -0.005 -0.24 0.040 1.29 -0.030 -1.82 c
Partnership 0.084 2.02 b 0.002 0.04 -0.036 -1.39
Firm Age 0.004 2.52 b 0.004 1.71 c 0.000 -0.05
Bus Bankruptcy -0.450 -2.81 a -0.092 -1.23
Bus Delinquencies -0.080 -3.56 a -0.120 -3.50 a 0.010 0.57
D&B Bus Credit Score 0.001 0.10 0.027 5.08 a
Use Bus Credit Card 0.025 1.39 -0.017 -0.70 0.000 0.00
Use Own Credit Card -0.005 -0.31 0.021 0.80 0.010 0.77
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.026 1.31 -0.040 -1.44 -0.033 -2.22 b
Industry
SIC 2 0.036 0.78 -0.018 -0.29 -0.013 -0.34
SIC 3 -0.009 -0.21 -0.016 -0.25 -0.054 -1.83 c
SIC 4 -0.014 -0.29 0.112 1.51 -0.088 -2.77 a
SIC 51 -0.013 -0.38 0.102 1.65 -0.015 -0.44
SIC 52 -0.025 -0.93 0.104 2.34 b -0.010 -0.43
SIC 6 0.039 0.85 0.035 0.56 -0.041 -1.19
SIC 7 0.001 0.03 -0.013 -0.32 0.002 0.08
SIC 8 0.056 1.60 0.027 0.56 -0.023 -0.85
1993 1998 2003
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Table 8 Panel B: 
Who Gets Credit?  
The dependent variable Get Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm 
applied for and was extended credit and a value of 0 if the firm applied for and was denied credit. 
These results are obtained as the second stage of a bivariate probit selection model where 
Applied for Credit is the selection equation. Applied for Credit takes on a value of 1 if the firm 
applied for credit and a value of 0 if the firm did not apply for credit because it was discouraged. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Market Characteristics:
MSA -0.100 -4.24 a -0.038 -1.05 -0.023 -1.23
HHI High 0.009 0.49 0.002 0.02 -0.094 -2.93 a
HHI Medium -0.010 -0.18 -0.068 -2.15 b
Owner Characteristics:
Owner Age 0.000 0.18 0.003 1.82 c 0.000 -0.16
Owner Experience -0.002 -1.54 -0.001 -0.62 0.001 0.82
Owner Graduate Degree -0.019 -0.66 0.059 1.39 0.066 2.56 b
Owner College Degree 0.000 0.01 0.042 1.17 -0.001 -0.08
Owner Some College -0.015 -0.64 0.010 0.30 -0.005 -0.31
Black Owner -0.096 -2.41 b -0.168 -3.45 a -0.179 -6.50 a
Asian Owner -0.056 -1.19 -0.107 -2.21 b -0.026 -0.83
Hispanic Owner -0.008 -0.19 -0.173 -3.94 a -0.005 -0.14
Female Owner -0.016 -0.76 -0.003 -0.09 0.034 2.13 b
Owner Bankruptcy -0.143 -2.97 a -0.367 -0.54 -0.083 -1.49
Owner Delinquencies -0.071 -2.94 a -0.130 -3.89 a -0.053 -2.88 a
Owner Judgement -0.103 -2.98 a -0.098 -2.04 b 0.026 0.83
Owner Personal Wealth -0.003 -0.26 0.016 1.50
1993 1998 2003
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Table 8 Panel C: 
Who Gets Credit?  
The dependent variable Get Credit is a binary variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm 
applied for and was extended credit and a value of 0 if the firm applied for and was denied credit. 
These results are obtained as the second stage of a bivariate probit selection model where 
Applied for Credit is the selection equation. Applied for Credit takes on a value of 1 if the firm 
applied for credit and a value of 0 if the firm did not apply for credit because it was discouraged. 
Data are from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance. Explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. 
a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Marginal Marginal Marginal
Variable Effect t-stat Effect t-stat Effect t-stat
Firm-Creditor Relationship Characteristics
MRL Source Savings Assoc 0.108 2.81 a -0.001 -0.01 0.035 1.43
MRL Source Finance Co 0.157 3.22 a 0.134 2.21 b 0.115 3.17 a
MRL Source Other 0.149 3.55 a -0.091 -1.84 c 0.135 3.10 a
MRL Length of Relationship 0.000 0.82 0.000 0.18 0.000 0.56
MRL Distance from Firm 0.000 -2.11 b 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.90
Number of Bank Sources 0.025 1.93 c 0.008 0.52 -0.011 -1.32
Number of Non-Bank Sources -0.020 -3.03 a 0.015 1.44 -0.025 -5.40 a
MRL Checking Relationship 0.013 0.56 0.017 0.50 0.024 1.32
MRL Savings Relationship 0.107 3.70 a -0.046 -1.14 0.031 1.32
MRL Fin'l Svcs Relationship 0.034 1.56 0.022 0.70 -0.017 -1.15
MRL Line of Credit Relationship 0.040 0.96 -0.052 -1.17 -0.041 -2.04 b
MRL Loan Relationship -0.031 -1.38 0.147 3.39 a 0.014 0.84
MRL is a Credit Line Renewal N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.185 8.35 a
MRL is a Lease -0.028 -0.51 0.039 0.71 0.027 0.44
MRL is a Mortgage -0.017 -0.59 0.155 3.12 a 0.090 4.05 a
MRL is a Motor Vehicle Loan 0.079 2.15 b 0.285 5.02 a 0.121 4.23 a
MRL is an Equipment Loan -0.024 -0.81 0.207 4.38 a 0.071 3.30 a
MRL is an Other Loan -0.081 -3.63 a 0.068 2.14 b 0.049 2.41 b
1993 1998 2003
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